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Murder by YouTube – Anti-Islamic speech and homicide 
liability 
 
Michael Bohlander
1
 
 
Abstract 
 
Usually, hate-speech and its criminalisation are looked at from the angle of a separate hate-speech offence, and often 
in the context of human rights law, especially freedom of speech and religion. In the Islamic world, such issues are 
treated under blasphemy laws and the availability of severe sanctions for that offence, not infrequently the death 
penalty, may make a separate recourse to homicide offences unnecessary. Yet, recent events in the Islamic world 
suggest that it would not be unimaginable to entertain the idea of a liability for the deaths of those killed in unrests 
caused by hate-speech, in Western legal systems: Can it be acceptable any longer, in the age of YouTube and other 
(social) networks of instantaneous and easy-access worldwide information traffic, that people intentionally put out 
inflammatory messages which they know will lead to unrests with the risk of lethal outcomes, without having to 
bear any legal consequences? Is freedom of speech a panacea which allows them to wash their hands of these 
obvious effects of their actions? Can the criminal law accommodate liability in such circumstances or are we asking 
the system to do something that it should not and maybe even cannot do? Is that kind of thinking the first step on a 
slippery slope towards religious censorship and thought-crime? Against the background of events such as those 
triggered in 2012 by the dissemination of the film Innocence of Muslims, we will look at the specific anti-Islamic 
context as an example where the lines appear to be particularly bright, because general experience tells us that the 
adherents of no other religion tend to react to religious provocations as violently and as predictably as a certain 
conservative sector of the Muslim community. This is a sensitive area as it partly deals with non-Muslim 
perceptions about Muslim self-perception which may not be shared by everyone, least of all the moderate Muslims 
who are not part of the problem, either. Yet it is necessary to start a discussion about the issue. By doing so, we do 
not contend that Islam is in any special position as far as the need for protection from defamation is concerned, yet it 
cannot be denied that the vast majority of the current problems in this field are specifically Islam-related. The 
Islamic context thus lends itself well to drawing the contours of the problem.  
 
Introduction – From defamation to homicide 
 
In recent times, the religion of Islam has been increasingly at the centre of often aggressive 
public and international disputes: A Danish newspaper publishes caricatures of Muhammad to 
find out how far it can stretch the envelope. American soldiers defile copies of the Qur’an. An 
American Christian minister publicly burns a copy of the Qur’an. A radical Coptic Christian in 
the USA makes a movie besmirching Muhammad and disseminates it on the internet. These 
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events become test cases for the freedom of expression. Their common consequence: Muslims in 
the Islamic world go on the rampage. Innocent people are killed by an enraged Muslim mob or 
die as a consequence of the response of law enforcement agencies trying to bring the situation 
under control. Advocates of the right to free speech, on the other hand, sometimes overlook that 
there are limits to that right as well, and that inflammatory intentional hate speech may not be 
deserving of such protection to the same degree as civilized, albeit engaged and even hard-hitting 
discourse. People who employ speech with the aim of debasing the Muslim target group may in 
fact be abusing their right to free speech – and the concept of an abuse of human rights has, for 
example, been recognised in one of the most advanced international human rights frameworks, in 
Art. 17 ECHR:  In such cases, there is no real interest in triggering a civilized discourse with 
Islam (or any religion or ideology), but a desire to cause offence, and the protagonists are at best 
indifferent to the consequences of their actions; however, it would not be outlandish to assume 
that they mostly are aware of what is bound to happen and at least reconcile themselves to that
2
. 
One can criticize Muhammad, even as a (cultural) Muslim, and address issues such as his 
relationship to women or the question of whether he really received the Qur’an by way of divine 
revelation, as recently done by the Iranian Kader Abdolah, who lives in the Netherlands, in his 
Dutch novel De Boodschapper (The Messenger)
3
. Critique and criticism of Islam and Muslim 
practices must be allowed, even if they touch the foundations of the faith. Yet, at the end of the 
day, there is always the same ideological stand-off: The West refers to its cherished freedom of 
speech and the famous dictum often – albeit wrongly4 – ascribed to Voltaire, “I disapprove of 
what you say but I shall defend to the death your right to say it!”, while the Muslims demand 
respect for their religion’s tenets even from those who do not share their faith, and hold Western 
governments responsible for not censuring the dissemination of the controversial material
5
.  Both 
positions in their extreme are untenable: No-one who is not a Muslim owes Islam as a religious 
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concept any respect, just as no Muslim owes any respect to Christianity, Judaism or secularism
6
. 
They each, however, owe respect to other people and their bodily integrity, property and dignity 
– especially when what they say can entail physical rather than mere psychological harm.  
 
Usually, hate-speech and its criminalisation are looked at from the angle of a separate hate-
speech offence, and often in the context of human rights law, especially freedom of speech and 
religion. In the Islamic world, such issues are traditionally treated under blasphemy laws and the 
availability of severe sanctions for that offence, not infrequently the death penalty, may make a 
separate recourse to homicide offences unnecessary. Human rights discourse as understood in the 
West does not yet seem to have a large impact across the Islamic spectrum, and even less in an 
Islamist environment. We should, however, remind ourselves that anyone in the West who utters 
blasphemous statements can already be tried and sentenced under the laws of any Islamic 
country depending on which kind of jurisdictional regime it subscribes to for such offences: 
Territorial, personal or universal. Barring some sort of exceptional legal immunity, no state can 
under international law prevent the prosecution and trial of its citizens for crimes committed 
abroad, possibly even in absentia. That it does not always happen, is a question of political 
power relations, not law. Yet, recent events in the Islamic world suggest that it would not be 
unimaginable to entertain the idea of a liability for the deaths of those killed in unrests caused by 
hate-speech in Western legal systems: Can it be acceptable any longer, in the age of YouTube 
and other (social) networks of instantaneous and easy-access worldwide information  traffic, that 
people intentionally put out  inflammatory messages which they know will lead to unrests with 
the risk of lethal outcomes, without having to bear any legal consequences? Is freedom of speech 
a panacea which allows them to wash their hands of these obvious effects of their actions? Can 
the criminal law accommodate liability in such circumstances or are we asking the system to do 
something that it should not and  maybe even cannot do? Is that kind of thinking the first step on 
a slippery slope towards religious censorship and thought-crime?  
 
Against the background of events such as those triggered in 2012 by the dissemination of the 
film Innocence of Muslims
7
, we will look at the specific anti-Islamic context as an example 
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where the lines appear to be particularly bright because general experience tells us that the 
adherents of no other religion tend to react to religious provocations as violently and as 
predictably as a certain, conservative sector of the Muslim community. By doing so, we do not 
contend that Islam is in any special position as far as the need for protection from defamation is 
concerned, yet it cannot be denied that the vast majority of the current problems in this field are 
specifically Islam-related. The Islamic context thus lends itself well to drawing the contours of 
the problem. We should also make it clear at this point that the object of study is not Islam itself, 
but the practices of some of its radical followers, which most will say do actually represent an 
aberration of the Islamic faith. The paper will therefore not address the writings of modern 
and/or moderate Muslims since they do not form part of the problem. Neither will we engage in 
an in-depth study of individual human rights systems or the relevant literature on where the 
threshold to the concept of an abuse of human rights should be located: It is sufficient for our 
purposes to state at the example of a few selected jurisdictions that every hunan rights system 
supports an abuse clause – where and when that clause is triggered in the individual system is a 
question of secondary significance. 
 
This paper is meant as a first foray into the field of potential homicide
8
 liability for reactions to 
intentional hate-speech by the addressees of the hate-speech. In simple terms: D intentionally 
defames V1’s religion, which leads V1 to use violence against property and people, among them 
V2 who dies in the violence. In graphic terms we have the following potential liability links: 
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This graph shows that D’s actions may be seen as triggering V2’s death at the hands of V1: D’s 
wheel turns the cogs of that of V1 and thus the wheel of V2: D’s and V2’s wheels turn in the 
same direction, whereas V1’s wheel turns in the opposite, an observation which neatly 
encapsules the discussion on causation which will follow below. This second result may be seen 
as (virtually) certain and attributable to D if the social relations between the three actors are of 
such  a nature that a comparison to an almost mechanical sequence of events would appear 
justifiable. This diagnosis is at this stage more of a factual one and made outside classical legal 
terminology such as joint criminal enterprise, procuring an offence, use of innocent agents, or, in 
German doctrinal terms, mittelbare Täterschaft, Nebentäterschaft; Anstiftung etc. Whether and 
to what extent it fits any of those categories remains to be seen. The main premises we will thus 
investigate in this paper are the following:  
 
 Recent history has shown how conservative/radical Muslims in many countries will react 
to provocations to their faith, and this experience has turned the risk of violent and often 
lethal Muslim reaction to such provocation into a social fact.  
 Once we accept the factual nature of that risk, we open the discourse to relationships of 
causality which naturally underlie criminal liability patterns. In other words, there may be 
D uses intentional 
hate-speech 
against V1 
V1 uses 
violence 
against V2 
in 
response  
V2  is killed 
in the 
violence 
used by V1 
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a causal link between the hate-speech and the killing or the death of innocent people who 
are targeted merely on the basis of some – and often spurious – affiliation with the hate-
speech offender as perceived by the Muslim killers. This is also a fact.  
 Because the Muslim killer will normally him- or herself be criminally liable for the 
killing, the impact of third-party intervention on the causal chain started by the hate-
speech user needs looking into.  
 Even if we assume that causality exists, the hate-speech offender may be allowed to use 
such speech, i.e. take the risk of lethal outcomes, because of his freedom of speech.  
 Finally, we need to ask ourselves whether the offender had the necessary mens rea with 
regard to the lethal outcome.  
 
We will begin by laying the groundwork for the assumption of a potential cause-effect 
relationship between hate-speech and the death of third parties. 
 
 
Setting the scene – The causes of the rage 
 
 
If we want to establish the “typical” conservative/radical Muslim reaction to criticism of Islam as 
a fact for the purposes of showing causal connectivity, we need to understand the psychological 
background and undercurrents of the religious environment in which most Muslims live. This is 
a sensitive area as it partly deals with non-Muslim perceptions about Muslim self-perception 
which may not be shared by everyone, least of all moderate Muslims. Yet it is necessary to at 
least start a discussion about the issue. It needs pointing out that we are not discussing any 
qualities of Islam as a religion as such, but the qualities of some of its more conservate and/or 
radical adherents in their daily practice of it. Moderate or even modernist Muslims are not part of 
the problem addressed in this paper. Naturally, as in any society, there are people, often very 
young, who participate in  riots for non-religious reasons, such as poverty, unemployment, lack 
of perspective, dissatisfaction with government policies
9
, a possible misapprehension of the 
meaning of democracy and the purpose of demonstrations etc. The religious aspect may for them 
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be a mere veneer, or maybe only one cause among many for their actions. For many protesters, 
however, it will be the main cause. That in turn requires us to try to understand conservative 
Islamic religious self-perception and the conservative attitude towards the meaning of tolerance.  
 
Islam would seem to tolerate the existence of other religions and ideologies
10
 – yet (a certain 
section of) the conservative Muslim community does not tolerate (hard-hitting) non-Muslim 
criticism of its own foundations. Mere absence of retaliation is not necessarily equal to tolerance. 
It may be for this reason, and  not out of a general genuine concern based on the equality of all 
religions (despite ubiquitous protestations to the contrary), that it puts such an emphasis on 
outlawing the defamation of religion
11
. It does by theological pedigree not see itself as being on 
an equal footing with other religions, but as superior because it is based on the last revelation – a 
trait it shares, for example, with Christianity in some of its historical and modern evangelical 
forms which will in turn view Islam as a heresy in its entirety. The efforts of the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) to have an international legal ban on the defamation of religion 
have proven fruitless so far. Its 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam
12
 is based on 
the divine commands of Islam, not on human liberty, and consequently it is under the general 
proviso that none of those rights may be exercised contrary to the dictates of Islamic law (see 
below). It seems to be a peculiarly Muslim concern to have a rule against defamation of the faith 
enshrined in legal form. While devout believers of other religions would sympathize with the 
Muslims’ motivation, none have found it necessary to take this matter to a political or even legal 
level to such a degree. This may to a large part be explained by the lack of a full secular 
disestablishment in most if not all Muslim countries – including recently Turkey – and by the 
nature of Islam as a religion that does doctrinally not distinguish between the private and public 
or even political exercise of religion: Its law, the Shari’ah, with its many rules and rituals, is part 
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 See sura 5:48. That is, however, not the entire picture. Roots of the claim for Muslim superiority even versus the 
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against Muslims on account of their religion, oppress them and drive them out of their homes…” The above suras 
are not mentioned in the Common Word. – Online at http://acommonword.com/index.php?lang=en&page=option1 
at 14. 
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and parcel of the religion and it permeates every Muslim’s life completely. Islam is a religion of 
law, of submission
13
, which is the very meaning of the word “Islam”.  In other words, 
traditional(ist) Muslims have no or at best very little choice – they cannot, must not enter into a 
compromise that restricts the exercise of Islamic tenets. These tenets, while ontologically non-
negotiable, are in daily practice nonetheless defined with different stringency in different sectors 
of Muslim society and the public/private divide may play a role after all in deciding what a 
Muslim can or cannot do within his own four walls, yet any issues around pivotal factors such as 
the person of its prophet, for example, rank high on the list of very sensitive topics.  
 
Because the traditional, conservative Muslim is restricted in the permissible range of avenues for 
social (and spiritual) intercourse, because he realizes that people in the West have a much more 
relaxed social (and spiritual) life, that this has to a large extent to do with the general set-up of 
(civil) society and the status of religion within it, yet that they are not all immoral individuals as 
radical Islamist propaganda is so fond of proclaiming
14
, he tends to react badly to fundamental 
challenges to his own self-imposed restrictions. His allegiance is not to a political idea that the 
vast majority of people living, for example, under Communism never really internalised – it is to 
God, to the very essence of his being. The traditional Muslim is aware that he lives in a kind of 
straitjacket, yet he does so out of obedience to God, who sent Man his rules to save him from the 
state of nature, from ignorance and darkness, from the jahiliyyah. His life is a sacrifice and he is 
keenly aware of the drawbacks this brings for his earthly existence, and he suffers those in 
expectation of a later reward from God. His submission is his honour. Yet, he is also a human 
being with human desires and may subconsciously fear that he may in reality be living, to put it 
very bluntly, in a cage that has an open door, and he can ill bear being taunted about his choice to 
remain inside. He might much rather prefer that people join him in enlarging his cage – yet at the 
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 Especially in Islamic jurisprudence there has been for a long time a struggle about the interpretation of the law, 
whether the literal meaning should take precedence in order to avoid human interference with and distortion of 
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from the traditionalists, as happened, for example, to the Sudanese reformer Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, who was 
executed in 1985 because he opposed the imposition of Shari’ah law in Sudan; see his book The Second Message of 
Islam, in the English translation by An-Na’im, 1987. An-Na’im, who was a student of Taha, was also detained 
without trial in Sudan during 1983 – 84.  
14
 This unease increases for many Muslims when confronted with controversial Egyptian Muslim reformer 
Muhammad Abduh’s words : “I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw 
Muslims, but not Islam.” – see Anke von Kügelgen, "’Abduh, Muhammad", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Brill, 2009.    
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same time the Qur’an tells him that there must be no compulsion in religion15. As was mentioned 
before, these are reflections of a non-Muslim about conservative Muslim self-perception and – 
nothwithstanding any good intentions on the part of the author based on his experiences with 
highly educated Muslim colleagues who do not fit this picture – will undoubtedly be 
controversial and considered stereotypical or even Orientalist in the sense of Edward W. Said’s 
famous 1978 critical study
16
, yet recent research by the Welsh-Egyptian Shereen El Feki in 
Egypt after the 2011 revolution would seem to underpin that contention, when she writes of the 
views expressed by a moderate member of the Muslim Brotherhood: “Freedom and equality are 
our principles, but within borders or limits set by Islam and society. ... ‘Freedom within a frame’ 
is how many inside the Brotherhood and out describe their dream of Egypt’s new order”17.  
 
The reason for the Muslim’s moral choice is his belief in the message brought by Muhammad. It 
is a message which forces him to engage in rituals the origins of which he does no longer 
understand, that clash with the patterns of life in the modern world, yet which make him feel 
guilty if he does not live by them; a message based on the Qur’an, the practical incarnation of 
which in the practice of Muhammad
18
 forbids him to think (too) independently about God and 
tells him to abide by the rules established by a class of more or less well-educated trained clerics-
cum-jurists, the ulama. As Bassiouni states: 
 
In addition to a combination of socioeconomic factors, there are two principal reasons for this 
contemporary phenomenon that links theological and legal doctrinal developments to political violence in 
the Muslim world. The first reason is that the level of knowledge about Islam among the masses in the 
Muslim world is not only basic, but in some social contexts, primitive. This is essentially because of a 
deficit in these societies’ human development, which allows misleading teachings of Islam by unqualified 
mullahs, imāms sheikhs, and other (self-)titled religious “leaders”. They are more likely political actors 
seeking to advance their views by propagating erroneous notions of Islam that the largely ignorant masses 
are ready to accept and follow, than true religious scholars. … [M]uch of it is also because of the low level 
of knowledge among those who are, or claim to be, Muslim scholars and whose teachings are contrary to 
Islam, or at least to a better and more enlightened understanding of Islam.
19
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who can teach it and how a Muslim can guide his life according to it; see Ahmad Atif Ahmad, The Fatigue of the 
Shari’a, 2012. 
19
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The second reason, according to Bassiouni, is the conservative scholars’ aversion against 
“intellectual openness” and the “denial of the role of reason as the framework for interpretation, 
or even as a method of interpretation”20. The ulama have been and still are overwhelmingly male 
as well as traditional, and since in many Muslim societies veneration increases with the age of 
the teacher, this has the likely effect of making conservative attitudes more influential. Muslims  
live by a message the words of which they were  told to learn by rote in an archaic form of 
Arabic without being instructed in its meaning and how to explore it – that is, if they understand 
Arabic at all, something the majority of global Muslims will not
21
. The traditional and often 
conservative ulama have had a stifling grip on the interpretation of both the Qur’an and the 
prophet’s practice, the Sunna, for centuries – and as can be seen at the example of Saudi Arabia, 
sometimes for manifest power-political reasons. The sources they use and the schools of thought 
they follow reach back to now often outdated scenarios from the earliest days of corporate Islam, 
yet historical-critical research from outside the black box of the religion into the primary sources  
is virtually absent, and their adaptation to the needs of a modern society is a matter which only a 
caste of courageous intellectuals have so far attempted but who, it needs emphasising, do not yet 
come anywhere near to representing mainstream Islam. Innovative thinking, especially by lay 
people, is still strongly discouraged as flawed innovation or bid’ah22 – despite the fact that Islam 
knows no central clerical hierarchy and allows choosing freely between different schools as best 
suits the individual Muslim’s plans on distinct occasions (takhayur). Thus it is no surprise that 
traditional, not to say anachronistic, perceptions of God and Muhammad and the origins of the 
faith still exist or are on the rise again under the Salafi movements
23
, and any criticism of 
Muhammad and his message against this backdrop is thus considered as threatening the very 
fabric of Islam: Unlike, for example, Christianity, Islam is based on a book which is said to be 
the verbatim word of God down to the last hamza. In Christian terms, taking away the nature of 
the Qur’an as divine is the same as taking Jesus Christ out of the salvation story. Insinuating that, 
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 Ibid., 8. 
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 The Qur’an is said to have been revealed in Arabic (e.g. Suras 42:7; 43:3; 44:58; 46:12) and any Muslim, no 
matter where he or she lives, has to memorise it in that language. It is sometimes said that there are no translations in 
the literal sense, only translations of the meaning of the Qur’an.  
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 See fn. 18 above. 
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Arabic al-salaf for predecessor or ancestor -, which aims to weed out the centuries of scholarly extrapolation from 
the basic sources and a return to those sources. The problem which all of these movements inevitably face is that 
they will have to rely on someone to interpret the sources and the cycle starts anew. 
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for example, Muhammad made it all up and/or only imagined/pretended that the angel Gabriel 
was telling him the words of God
24
 is tantamount to pulling the rug from under Islam
25
 - and 
consequently considered a serious heresy.  While many moderate, educated and perhaps well-
travelled Muslims who understand the secularists’ motivations and concerns about free speech as 
a fundamental political principle may still be deeply offended, they will counsel and practice 
restraint in reaction – yet the mobs who attack embassies, burn flags etc. will often be made up 
mostly of less well-educated or otherwise disenfranchised persons, who in not merely a few 
cases may also have been incited by their local traditonally and themselves badly educated 
imams and/or radical Islamist groups who have their own (political) agenda.   
 
The recurring debate about a Muslim and particularly Arab inferiority complex vis-à-vis the 
West
26
 and its historical achievements especially in modern history is also a factor to be taken 
into account
27
 since it centres aroud questions such as the following: If the Muslims are God’s 
chosen people, why is it that the unbelievers have a better life, better schooling and social 
security systems etc. and a vibrant civil society? Why is there so much abject poverty, 
analphabetism and political disenfranchisement among the Muslims in their own countries? Why 
did the Muslim conquests in Europe stop centuries ago, and were almost entirely reversed? Why 
did the golden age of Muslim scientists end so many centuries ago, to be repalced by a debate 
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 Which was one of the central messages of the controversial book The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie. 
25
 Historical-critical approach to the Qur‘an is in tension with the traditional Islamic interpretation that it is the 
verbatim word of God in a much stricter sense than this phrase was ever used in Christian theology. Historical-
critical theory puts the origin of the Qur’an in a historical context and thus allows for a potential influence by the 
recipient of the revelations, Muhammad, or even of the Companions, on its content, something which is again the 
equivalent to blasphemy in Islam. Christianity has had to endure this particular critique for some time now, whereas 
historical-critical research with a perspective from outside the system seems to be still in its infancy within Islam. – 
See on this whole field Neuwirth/Sinai/Marx (eds.), The Qur’an in Context – Historical and Literary Investigations 
into the Qur’anic Milieu, 2010; Gabriel Said Reynolds (ed.), The Qur’an in its Historical Context, 2009, and id. (ed.) 
The Qur’an in its Historical Context 2, 2011; by the writer working under the pseudonym Ibn Warraq, The Origins 
of the Koran, 1998; and on a textual understanding of the Qur’an Nasr Hamid Abu Said, Gottes Menschenwort – Für 
ein humanistisches Verständnis des Koran, 2008. See also the highly controversial approach by Christoph 
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Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, 2002; Ibn Warraq, Why the West is Best – A Muslim Apostate’s 
Defense of Liberal Democracy, 2011. 
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about “Islamic science”, with no revival of a non-imported scientific community and movement 
in sight?
28
 All of these factors may serve to put the conservative devout Muslim under an 
enormous psychological stress, or as Mohammed al-Jabri has said: 
 
“.. [T]he contemporary Arab reader is restricted by his tradition and crushed by his present, which means 
firstly that tradition absorbs him, robs him of independence and freedom. Since he entered the world he has 
been inculcated with tradition, in the form of a certain vocabulary and a certain attitude, language and way 
of thinking; in the form of fables, legends and imaginary ideas, a certain manner of relating to things and a 
manner of thought; in the form of knowledge and truths. He receives all this without any critical analysis 
and without an iota of critical intellect. Through these inculcated elements he perceives things; on them he 
bases his opinions and observations. The exercise of thinking under these conditions resembles more a 
memory game. When the Arab reader delves into the traditional texts, then his manner of reading is that of 
remembering, in no way, however, is it exploring or reflecting.”29 
 
None of this, naturally, excuses Muslim mob violence and the killing
30
 of innocent people. The 
vast majority of Muslims will rightly tell you that this is not Islam, either, and that those 
engaging in it are a small minority who give Islam a bad name
31
. They are a minority but they act 
in the name of Islam, and not all of them are violent Islamist terrorists in disguise, but may 
simply be deeply offended conservative believers, whose education and social environment may 
not have provided them with different coping mechanisms in order to react to such intrusions 
into one of their central life-spaces.  
 
Why is all this theological and sociological background important here? Because it may help 
explain why even otherwise sensible, friendly and generous conservative Muslims seem to 
undergo a dramatic change when it comes to attacks on their faith. Their faith is the one uniting 
and determining factor which they can cling to against the background of an otherwise mostly 
failed development of what we would call civil society, in many Islamic countries. Especially as 
far as the Arab world is concerned, there is areinforcing combination with a cultural trait, in that  
                                                 
28
 See on this issue Nidhal Guessoum, Islam’s Quantum Question – Reconciling Muslim Tradition and Modern 
Science, 2011. 
29
 Mohamed Abed al-Jabri, Kritik der arabischen Vernunft – Die Einführung, 2009, 86 - 87. The translation of the 
excerpt is by the author from the German version of al-Jabri’s book “Naqd al-aql al-arabi“, which in turn was 
translated from the French. For a more extensive discussion of the complexities surrounding the approach to Arab 
Reason see the volume by al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason – Text, Tradition and the Construction of 
Modernity in the Arab World, 2011. 
30
 Or incitement to murder by government officials, as committed by Pakistani minister for railways Bilour; see 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/09/21/pakistan-government-minister-ghulam-ahmad-bilour_n_1905949.html. 
31
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an Arab’s honour is defined to a large extent by what other people think of him: “’Honour’, an 
Arab saying goes, ‘is what people hear about you: Your honour is your reputation’” 32. This 
translates also to the level of group honour. To tell the average Arab to stand above things and to 
be calmly assured of himself no matter what people say will not easily resonate with his cultural 
DNA.  Similar things can be said about the societies in other traditionally conservative parts of 
the Muslim world such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia.  
 
Therefore, as things stand now, it is highly likely, if not even virtually certain, that provocations 
such as those by the recent film about Muhammad, will trigger (lethal) violence in a certain 
segment of the Muslim population. It is also questionable, whether our Western, Middle-
European attitude as to what constitutes sufficient reason to give in to a provocation would be 
viewed in the same way in the Arab or the wider Muslim world. We have to regard this 
difference as a social fact, whether we morally agree with its origins or not and whether it is to 
the Muslim world’s credit or not. It may be desirable for it to change sooner rather than  later  
and  so far it has not changed significantly, yet is it not for those in the West to change it even if 
one could impute only the best intentions to such efforts, which realistically we cannot – the 
experience of Western colonialism in the Muslim world should have cured us of that fallacious 
assumption by now.   
 
Facts come  in two broad categories: causes and effects. This is where we move to the liability 
issue. 
 
From cause to effect – Analysing the spheres of responsibility  
 
Someone who intentionally disseminates highly inflammatory hate-speech, i.e. through any kind 
of publicly accessible media outlets, in a context where history and experience have shown the 
prevalence of an extremely low tolerance threshold on the recipients’ side before violent action is 
taken, should have a good reason why he or she risks a reaction that can cost lives. Clearly, the 
actual killing is done by others and they are criminally liable for those acts themselves – even if 
                                                 
32
 Allen, Arabs, 2006, 46; see also Nydell, Understanding Arabs – A Guide for Modern Times, 4th ed., 2006, 24, 43 
ff.,  Patai, The Arab Mind, revised ed., 2007, 95 ff., 108 ff. 
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prosecutions are often impossible due to the absence of evidence. Yet, the ultimate trigger for the 
killing is the hate-speech dissemination. The factors to be considered are thus threefold: 
 
 Does the hate-speech cause the deaths? 
 If it does, is the disseminator allowed to take that kind of risk? 
 Does the disseminator have the required mens rea for legal liability? 
 
Causation – factual and legal 
 
The usual definition of causation in the factual or scientific sense is the conditio sine qua non 
formula: A fact is the cause of another fact if the second fact would not exist but for the 
existence and effect of the first fact. It is immediately intelligible that this definition allows a 
regression ad infinitum: In the final analysis, in the realm of human agency, Adam and Eve are to 
blame for everything. Using this approach, factual causation is clearly made out: Had it not been 
for the dissemination of the hate-speech, the killing would not have occurred. However, it is 
equally obvious that the argument cannot only be based on simple factual causation. Any legal 
response must bear in mind that based on societal conventions, some kinds of conduct and some 
causes may lose their operational effect because of the behaviour of others which in our moral-
ethical opinion extinguishes the effect of the first cause.  
 
These cases are those of the so-called novus actus interveniens: A typical example is the accident 
victim who is brought to the hospital in an ambulance; on arrival she is killed by a suicide 
bomber who wanted to blow up the entire hospital. Factually, the person who caused the accident 
also caused her death because she would not have been there had it not been for the accident. 
Yet, we will frown upon holding the first person causally responsible because this kind of causal 
chain is so far removed from what you could ordinarily expect to happen, from what the usual 
risks connected with an accident and a hospital stay are. It seems morally wrong to say that the 
death was caused by the one responsible for the accident, especially if the accident was based on 
negligence and not intent, as in the case of someone running amok etc., and if the original cause 
was not lethal in itself.  The general view seems to be that if someone intentionally intervenes in 
the course of events, even if they exploit the existing situation for their own ends without acting 
15 
 
in concert with the first person, then the chain of causation should be considered as broken. As 
the House of Lords stated for English law in R v Latif: 
 
The general principle is that the free, deliberate and informed intervention of a second person, who intends 
to exploit the situation created by the first, but is not acting in concert with him, is held to relieve the first 
actor of criminal responsibility
33
. 
 
Similar views are voiced, for example, in German law where, however, the attitude to (free, 
deliberate and informed) third party interventions is even more restrictive and requires extinction 
of the effect of the original cause
34
. If the two people are acting in concert, they will both be 
liable under the rules of joint criminal enterprise or similar concepts on participation in other 
jurisdictions
35
. What we need to be clearly aware of in this context, however, is that we are now 
no longer talking about factual causation in its literal sense, but about restrictions on the 
operation of factual causation based on moral and public policy considerations. This is called 
“legal causation” in some jurisdictions, and “objective ascription” (objektive Zurechnung) in 
others
36
. This ascription can therefore in theory fluctuate with changing views on morals and 
public policy. In any event, all systems will agree that the new cause should be of such a degree 
that it does not just add to the existing cause but makes it appear irrelevant for moral purposes. 
Put another way, as long as the original cause has some morally discernible effect, it remains 
relevant: A cause does not have to be the only cause for a given result in order to create liability 
under law for the person who set that cause. Another important fact to be aware of in this context 
is that in order to decide upon legal causation or ascription, the mental state of the offender 
(intent, negligence, motivation) already comes into play, something that has no bearing 
whatsoever on factual causation: I may not even be aware, despite thorough checking, that the 
handbrake of the car which I parked at a steep incline two minutes ago is faulty and will snap in 
the next ten seconds, thereby allowing the car to roll down the hill and crush my wife out on a 
walk with our newly born twin-babies in the pram to death – factually, I caused their death. 
Would we say that morally the same should apply and that I should possibly be liable for 
                                                 
33
 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 104 at 115. 
34
 Walter in Leipziger Kommentar zum StGB, 2007, Vor § 13 mn 103 ff. 
35
 See for an in-depth treatment from a comparative perspective the volume by Alan Reed/Michael Bohlander (eds.), 
Participation in Crime – Domestic and Comparative Perspectives, 2013. 
36
 Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law, 2009, 18, 45 ff. 
16 
 
manslaughter? Again, it is essential to understand that here we are not yet talking about whether 
actus reus and mens rea overlap as far as causation is concerned, i.e. the so-called 
“correspondence principle” for an individual offence, but about the much earlier stage whether 
certain typical constellations of intent and more to the point, motive, and outcome require us to 
restrict factual causation based on moral reservations. This does, of course, not detract from the 
realisation that these typical constellations may partially be based on extrapolations from cases 
where this correspondence is typically missing in specific categories. 
 
How does that translate for our purposes? We can safely say that the enraged Muslims are not 
acting in concert with the provoker, but that their interests and intents are diametrically opposed 
to his: They are enemies. They are not exploiting the situation for their own benefit. They would 
rather he had never uttered the hate-speech. They are acting on the very provocation. The idea 
behind Latif does not apply, even if we were prepared to accept it on its rather broad terms 
without qualification. Any attempts to construe some form of joint enterprise between inimical 
agents directly engaged in a conflict with each other, as the UK Supreme Court recently tried to 
do in R v Gnango
37
 would appear futile and contrived. We thus have to look at the two sides to 
the interaction as separate potential causal elements that are not linked by a joint plan, that they 
are multiple independent perpetrators, in German terms, for example, Nebentäter
38
, or possibly 
in some variations as a case of abetting (Anstiftung), where the knowledge of the principal that 
he is being incited to a criminal offence is not necessary
39
; in English law terms it may be seen as 
an instance of procuring, which requires causation of the decision of the principal, but no 
consensus (unlike abetting and counselling) and hence no knowledge of the principal, either
40
. It 
needs to be stressed, however, that the scenario of secondary participation requires some form of 
intention on D’s part to make P commit the retaliatory offence of homicide or assault, something 
that will not always be present in the hate-speech cases. This leaves us with the following 
scenarios, in all of which D intentionally uses hate-speech to begin with: 
 
                                                 
37
 [2011] UKSC 59. – See the critique by Bob Sullivan, Accessories and Principals after Gnango, in Alan 
Reed/Michael Bohlander ibid (fn. 35), 25. 
38
 Michael Bohlander, ibid. (fn. 36), 160. 
39
 Schönke/Schröder-Heine, StGB, 28
th
 ed., 2010, § 26 marginal no.. 12 
40
 David Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th ed., 2011, 192 ff. 
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1. D, the disseminator, intends to make the Muslims (M) use lethal violence as a response 
and he knows or hopes they will kill members of certain target groups or people 
indiscriminately with intent. 
2. D intends to make M use violence which he expects may generally cause lethal results 
either by M or the law enforcement auhorities in their task to restore order, to wich he has 
reconciled himself or to which he is indifferent. 
3. D does not intend M to use violence, but foresees that it may ensue, with lethal 
consequences; he nonetheless hopes that no-one will be hurt or killed. 
4. D does not intend M to use violence and does not foresee that it may ensue. 
All four of these scenarios may need to be qualified further by the following subcategories as 
appropriate: 
 
a) M kill members of the target group intentionally. 
b) M kill people indiscriminately but intentionally. 
c) M kill people without intention but through recklessness or negligence41. 
d) The police kill people intentionally, recklessly or negligently in exercise of their duty to 
maintain public security and protect other important legal interests. 
Let us perform a declension of these categories in order to gain an impression whether we would 
be willing to argue that the behaviour of M should exclude D’s liability by morally restricting the 
operation of factual causality. 
 
 
Scenario 1 
 
D, the disseminator, intends to make the Muslims (M) use lethal violence as a response and he 
knows or hopes they will kill members of certain target groups or people indiscriminately with 
intent. 
 
D’s intention may be to arouse resentment and hatred of M in the global public opinion because 
of their violent reaction, and possibly even governmental action to repress them, whether by 
                                                 
41
 Let us assume for argument’s sake that the criminal law of the respective jurisdiction penalises negligent killing. 
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domestic or foreign governments, to engineer an ever tighter immigration regime for Muslims, 
their expulsion from Western countries or sheer racial hatred etc. The intentional killings by M 
are thus an essential part of D’s plan. He will be disappointed if they do not occur and will 
consider his efforts as having failed. His desire to see lethal outcomes is not necessarily tied to 
deaths from certain target groups, such as, for example, Americans or other Westerners. In 
effect, he uses a typically terrorist stratagem which does not merely want to cause the primary 
harm to a target group, but uses the target group’s response as a means of further escalating the 
conflict. It is also important to note that once he has publicly “launched the missile” of his hate-
speech, he has no longer any control over the consequences. The death of the victims is not a too 
remote
42
 consequence of D’s actions, either. In the sub-scenarios mentioned above, one can 
therefore say the following:  
 
a) M kill members of the target group intentionally. 
 
D achieves exactly what he wants to happen in the first place and based on experience with 
prior Muslim reactions to such provocations this course of events was objectively entirely 
foreseeable. The mere fact that the actual killing is done intentionally by M does therefore 
not represent a morally required restriction on the factual causality of his actions for the 
deaths.  
 
b) M kill people indiscriminately but intentionally. 
 
As with a) above, this was part of D’s plan; if anything, the hope for indiscriminate killing 
may be considered even worse than a restriction to a certain target group. Should no member 
of the latter be among the casualties, we will hardly say that this morally exonerates D in 
causal terms: A life is a life, especially in contexts where D cannot control the effects of his 
actions, such as in the present case. We are not dealing here with individualised scenarios of 
error in persona or aberratio ictus because of errors of identity or missing the target in 
                                                 
42
 See Jeremy Horder, Transferred Malice and the Remoteness of Unexpected Outcomes from Intentions, [2006] 
Crim. L.R. 383. 
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assassination cases which take place in the bad weather conditions so often used in criminal 
law textbooks. 
 
c) M kill people without intention but through recklessness or negligence. 
 
As in a) but in this case, D does not achieve the full objective of his plan which was to cause 
maximum revulsion against M based on their intentional killings etc. It would, however, 
seem odd to see the fact that the killing was done unintentionally as in any way alleviating 
the moral blame to be placed on D: The moral difference related to the causal chain of events 
as far as the deaths are concerned is based on disappointed criminal energy, not on a fact that 
went beyond the damage that D had envisaged and hoped for and would thus be more 
difficult to attribute to his plans. It is merely a factual minus vis-à-vis the desired result. 
There is no objective moral reason to exempt D from the effects of factual causation. 
 
d) The police kill people intentionally, recklessly or negligently in the exercise of their duty to 
maintain public security and protect other important legal interests. 
 
That the law enforcement authorities may have to use force to quell riots by M is again 
entirely predictable, and the actual degree of force used may be more or less so depending 
which region of the world we are talking about. Yet, that any police force may in certain 
cases have to use direct lethal force or that collateral damage may occur, is not out of the 
ordinary. The same goes for occasional violations of the rules of engagement and excessive 
use of force because of the heat of battle – this is also generally foreseeable. The only 
imaginable moral exemption would appear to arise in cases where the police themselves 
intentionally pursue illegal objectives in their use of (lethal) force not contemplated by D at 
all, such as, for example, taking the riots as a pretext to crack down on a political opposition 
movement or on an ethnic group in a campaign of persecution etc. Yet, if the police force is 
itself made up entirely of Muslims, even the latter exemption scenario may not apply, 
because then D can still point to the excessively aggressive nature of other M than those he 
may originally have targeted. In other, more general words, if the original aim is reached by 
other means, we may be merely dealing with a morally irrelevant deviation from the 
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(imagined) causal chain. If one wanted to apply the – in my view in the actual case rather 
bizarre – reasoning in R v Pagett43 from English law, the use of defensive or otherwise 
legitimate force by the police in the execution of their duties would not even serve to create a 
second causal fact that could compete with the one triggered by D. 
 
In sum, in Scenario 1 it would appear difficult to find moral reasons that would require us to 
release D from the effects of factual causation. If his very intention is the causation of death – 
maybe even in a country a few thousand miles away – then moral considerations do not require 
us not to view his actions as causal in almost any of the above scenarios. 
Scenario 2 
 
D intends to make M use violence which he expects may generally cause lethal results either by 
M or the police, to which he has reconciled himself or to which he is indifferent. 
 
It would appear that this general category based on lower form of mens rea, which may be 
termed recklessness or dolus eventualis
44
 unless one would still want to apply oblique Woollin
45
 
intent, depending on the degree of indifference and foresight of risk of death, does not fare any 
better than Scenario 1 in moral terms in any of the sub-scenarios. It is here that the absolute lack 
of control over the consequences once the “missile is launched” comes into play, together with 
the predictability of lethal violence by M. Although D may not directly intend to cause deaths 
and the use of violence by M as a means of response may be sufficient for his purposes, he still 
displays a total disregard for human life by taking an incalculable risk of major harm and treating 
its destruction as an acceptable means of pursuing his ulterior motives. From his point of view, 
the exact nature of the killing has actually even become irrelevant, which is why neither the 
intentional killing nor the other varieties set out in the sub-scenarios are morally relevant to 
denying the causal link. 
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 Michael Bohlander, ibid. (fn. 36), 60 ff. 
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Scenario 3 
 
D does not intend M to use violence, but foresees that it may ensue, with lethal consequences; he 
nonetheless hopes that no-one will be hurt or killed. 
 
These will be the ordinary cases of stretching the envelope, one would assume, such as the 
Danish newspaper cartoon case. The difference to Scenario 2 is the even lower degree of 
preparedness to countenance the possible realisation of the otherwise well-seen risk. We are 
moving in the sphere of advertent (gross) negligence, possibly still even in the lower reaches of 
Cunningham-style
46
 subjective recklessness, and given the obviousness of the major nature of 
the risk and the total lack of control by D whether it materialises, this may be no more than a 
case of hoping against hope and thus in effect just another case of unacceptable risk-taking. As 
far as causation is concerned, no moral exemptions seem required. 
 
Scenario 4 
 
D does not intend M to use violence and does not foresee that it may ensue. 
 
The difference to Scenario 3 is that here we are left with only inadvertent negligence, Caldwell
47
 
recklessness, or if  the individual jurisdiction still subscribes to it, constructive liability, if one 
wanted to view the publication of the hate-speech as an inherently dangerous and criminal act
48
. 
Whether they could be used as the basic offence for something like constructive manslaughter is 
thus doubtful, and excluded in jurisdictions such as Germany whose § 18 of the Criminal Code 
abolished the previous constructive concept of versari in res illicita
49
. In any event, D would 
have to face the argument of creating an uncontrollable and to the average observer glaringly 
obvious and major risk. It is difficult to find cogent moral reasons to say that in this case the 
chain of causation should be regarded as broken. 
 
                                                 
46
 [1957] 2 QB 396. 
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 [1982] AC 341. 
48
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In all of the above scenarios it is thus in the final analysis the seriousness and the obviousness of 
the risk taken by D which militate against finding any moral qualifier that could exclude the 
operation of factual causality. The differing degrees of intent and knowledge of the offender only 
serve to drive this realisation home more clearly, and the more so the more D knows. Regardless 
of whether M have contributed a cause to the victims’ death, D’s cause is still operating as well.  
 
In this context, the law of the United States in 18 U.S.C. § 247 takes an interesting approach to 
deaths caused as a consequence of damage to religious property and obstruction of persons in the 
free exercise of religious beliefs. The intriguing part of this provision and others using similar 
language (ss. 241 and 242) is that it has been held that the lethal result is not an element of the 
offence but an aggravating circumstance that justifies enhanced punishment, and is a mere matter 
of “proximate causation”, i.e. if it was a  
 
“reasonably foreseeable consequence of his or her conduct in violation of the statute. The 
defendant need not have intended that the death result, nor need he or she have directly caused the 
death. In addition, even events over which he or she did not have control, including the acts of the 
victim or third parties, will not break the chain of legal causation if they were reasonably 
foreseeable. Courts also have held that the penalty enhancement applies even where the person 
whose bodily injury (or death) resulted was not the intended victim of the offense, and that, where 
multiple violations result in one person's death or bodily injury, the penalty enhancement may be 
applied to multiple counts”50.  
 
Overall, causation would thus not seem to pose an insuperable obstacle to liability at least in the 
majority of cases. 
 
The effect of free speech protection on liability 
 
On moral grounds, and despite having established legal causation, we may absolve D from 
liability if he was permitted to take the risk, even if it constituted an obvious lethal risk. Whether 
we view this as a question of negating the offence description, actus reus or Tatbestand
51
 already 
– possibly even as a further consideration in legal causation – or as a general defence of 
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 Lu-in Wang, WestLaw, HateCrimes, 7. Damage to Religious Property; Obstruction of Persons in the Free 
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permissible action on a separate tier of the offence structure, is a secondary doctrinal issue which 
we will not delve into because it is irrelevant for the fundamental question we are pursuing here. 
The effects on liability of the principal offender – as opposed to secondary participants – will be 
mostly identical. There is no established general criminal law defence which presents itself, but 
we may say that if the law on freedom of expression allowed the offender to say or express what 
he did, then criminal liability  should not attach to his actions. The laws on free speech thus have 
a gatekeeper function vis-à-vis liability: If the law allows you to say what you say without regard 
to the consequences then you cannot be liable even for lethal outcomes.  
 
As we already indicated above, this question arises with full stringency only in Western or 
secular jurisdictions which subscribe to a wide interpretation of free speech. If the offender is 
arrested and tried in a country which does not use the same standard of free speech, as do most 
states in the Islamic world when it comes to defamations of their religious main tenets
52
, then the 
issue does not arise in law
53
. Free speech laws are notoriously difficult to pin down when it 
comes to defining their criteria. Let us take a brief look at some jurisdictions to highlight the 
argument. Even in highly developed human rights regimes such as the ECHR, the judicial 
attitudes especially in the context of the clash between free speech and religious sensitivities are 
often on the one hand doctrinally not very sophisticated and, on the other hand, not always 
consistent, as Ian Leigh, for example, has convincingly shown at the example of the case law of 
the ECtHR
54
. An initial conceptual objection which may be made with respect to any critical 
comments about a religion or its protagonists is that a human rights regime does not protect the 
religion as such from defamation but if at all, its human adherents i.e. the believers. This matter 
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is sometimes treated under the heading of the “right not to be offended”55.  Leigh is correct that 
at least under the ECHR, there is no such right
56
. There is no clash of the free speech right with 
the freedom of religion, either and arguments based on that dichotomy fail to appreciate the 
nature of both rights.  They both are primarily directed against the state, not against other 
individuals i.e. there is no horizontal conflict between them: The state must protect the right to 
free speech and it must also protect the right to freedom of religion. However, even if an atheist 
activists’ organisation, for example, engaged in a major non-violent campaign against a 
particular religion, that would not stop the adherents of that religion from exercising their 
religion freely. The question thus becomes one of restriction of free speech as a human right on 
its own terms and in the context of the overall regime
57
.  
 
In the ECHR this idea has manifested itself in Articles 10
58
 and 17
59
. Any restriction of free 
speech should thus happen solely under the criteria of Art. 10(2) ECHR, and not based on a 
balancing exercise with the freedom of religion as a conflicting human right. That the religious 
feelings of the believers of the attacked religion will, however, come into play in the evaluation 
to be made under Art. 10(2) ECHR is obvious and, more to the point, so will the likelihood of a 
violent reaction with possible physical or lethal injury.  
 
A related but distinct secondary preliminary objection is that expressing offensive or debasing 
opinions about a religion as such should not be caught by human rights protections but that the 
expression must be (also) aimed at a definable group of persons. Apart from the fact that this 
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distinction is not always an easy one to make
60
 because an attack on the teachings of a religion 
may in many cases involve a collateral attack on the feelings of its adherents and that the 
scenario is easily amended for argument’s sake to include an attack on a particular group (say the 
Muslims of Pakistan, the Muslims at a particular mosque etc.), the ECtHR seems in effect to 
have treated “the Muslims” as such a group61 and even employed the non-admissibility barrier of 
Art. 17 ECHR for certain Islamophobic statements, especially if they seem “gratuitously 
offensive”62. The ECtHR has more generally held in this context that  
 
“… tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a 
democratic, pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered 
necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which 
spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance…”.
63
  
 
The issue at hand is thus not so much against whom the offensive speech is aimed, but what its 
substance is and whether that substance is permissible. The views on this will naturally diverge.  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Whatcott
64
 recently had an opportunity to elucidate freedom of 
speech restrictions under Canada’s constitutional law and it held that three main criteria must be 
followed.  Firstly, that courts must apply hate speech prohibitions objectively and ask whether a 
“reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as 
exposing the protected group to hatred”.  Secondly, the terms “hatred” and “hatred and 
contempt” should be “restricted to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the 
words ‘detestation’ and ‘vilification’”.  Expression which aree repugnant and offensive but do 
not “incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection that risks causing 
discrimination or other harmful effects” are excluded.  Thirdly, the analysis must focus on the 
“effect of the expression at issue, namely whether it is likely to expose the targeted person or 
group to hatred by others.  The repugnancy of the ideas being expressed is not sufficient to 
justify restricting the expression, and whether or not the author of the expression intended to 
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incite hatred or discriminatory treatment is irrelevant”.  The paramount consideration lies in 
determining the “likely effect of the expression on its audience, keeping in mind the legislative 
objectives to reduce or eliminate discrimination.  In light of these three directives, the term 
“hatred” contained in a legislative hate speech prohibition should be applied objectively to 
determine whether a reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the 
expression as likely to expose a person or persons to detestation and vilification on the basis of a 
prohibited ground of discrimination”.65 The Court went on to define the underlying rationale as 
follows: 
The objective for which the limit is imposed, namely tackling causes of discriminatory activity to 
reduce the harmful effects and social costs of discrimination, is pressing and substantial.  Hate 
speech is an effort to marginalize individuals based on their membership in a group.  Using 
expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimize group members in 
the eyes of the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within society.  Hate 
speech, therefore, rises beyond causing distress to individual group members.  It can have a 
societal impact.  Hate speech lays the groundwork for later, broad attacks on vulnerable groups 
that can range from discrimination, to ostracism, segregation, deportation, violence and, in the 
most extreme cases, to genocide.  Hate speech also impacts on a protected group’s ability to 
respond to the substantive ideas under debate, thereby placing a serious barrier to their full 
participation in our democracy.
66
 
 
The stance of the US Supreme Court is recognised as one of the most liberal ones world-wide; in 
the landmark case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, Brennan J famously stated that "the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action".
67
 German  law, 
for example, regulates hate-speech based on religious grounds under §§ 166 f StGB
68
. The thrust 
of the provisions is the protection of the public peace, not the religion as such.  
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Section 166 
Defamation of religions, religious and ideological associations 
(1) Whosoever publicly or through dissemination of written materials … defames the religion or ideology 
of others in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace, shall be liable to imprisonment not 
exceeding three years or a fine. 
(2) Whosoever publicly or through dissemination of written materials … defames a church or other 
religious or ideological association within Germany, or their institutions or customs in a manner that is 
capable of disturbing the public peace, shall incur the same penalty. 
  
Section 167 
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In stark contrast, the traditional Islamic approach can be found in the 1990 Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam
69
, the words of which speak for themselves:   
 
Article 22 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be 
contrary to the principles of the Shari'ah. 
(b) Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn 
against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shari'ah.  
(c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as 
may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical values or 
disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. 
(d) It is not permitted to excite nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an 
incitement to any form of racial discrimination. 
 
Article 24 
All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah. 
 
Article 25 
The Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of 
the articles of this Declaration
70
. 
 
What this anecdotal comparison of a few jurisdictions was meant to show is that while there are 
differences in the national attitudes about the exact point when the threshold is reached where 
speech becomes liable to censure, all systems agree that there is such a point. No system allows 
any kind of speech without at least some restrictions. The point of this paper is not to gauge 
precisely where in the different systems the film Innocence of Muslims in particular is to be 
located but it would seem fair to say even for the average free-speech supporting observer, after 
watching it, that any complaint against its censure under the ECHR could already run afoul of 
the abuse clause in Art. 17 ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR: The film has no discernible 
purpose other than ridiculing and debasing the Islamic faith and its adherents, there is no 
colourable case in my view that the producer(s) intended it as a mere means in a serious societal 
                                                                                                                                                             
Disturbing the exercise of religion 
(1) Whosoever 
1.  intentionally and inappropriately disturbs a religious service or an act of religious worship of a church or 
other religious association within Germany or 
2.  commits defamatory mischief at a place dedicated to the religious worship of such a religious 
association 
shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine. 
(2) The ceremonies of an ideological association within Germany shall be equivalent to religious worship. 
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discourse, however aggressively that may be conducted. From the point of view of probably even 
the most liberal Muslims, it constitutes a grave case of blasphemy and defamation of Muhammad 
which goes well beyond the Danish newspaper cartoon instance in seriousness.  
 
Mens rea – General trigger levels and mistakes 
 
The question of which kind of mens rea D will have and must have depends on the one hand on 
the actual facts, and on the other on the legal framewok within which he utters his statement. As 
recent research by Mohamed Elewa Badar
71
 on the difficulties of deducing a joint concept of 
mens rea categories in international criminal law has highlighted again, the doctrinal approaches 
vary widely. Some systems employ a more restrictive regime which supports an enhanced 
blameworthiness model where a high degree of culpability, both with respect to cognitive and 
volitional elements are required, others allow the use of negligence, simple or gross, or even 
constructive or strict liability to establish criminal liability. In most cases, the picture will be that 
of a mixture of the above. Here we return to the categories we already used in the context of our 
study of moral exceptions to physical causation above: D may intend for lethal violence to occur, 
he may only wish to see physical violence or violence against inanimate objects. He may not 
desire that at all but foresee that it is a virtually certain consequence of his actions, or that it is 
merely a risk which may manifest itself, he may be wilfully blind or he may simply have omitted 
to use the necessary diligence in finding out about the potential effects. Whether he is liable 
under a state’s criminal law will depend on the mens rea regime that state applies. Whether D 
has foresight of the effects of his actions is a matter for the evidence in each case. As far as the 
violent reactions of Muslims to anti-Islamic hate-speech are concerned, it will become 
increasingly difficult for any offender to argue that he did not know or could not have known 
what consequences his conduct may be likely to trigger: The modern ubiquitous instant 
availability of media coverage in such high-profile issues would serve to eradicate any ignorance 
in the short- to mid-term. 
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This argument will naturally also apply to questions of mistake of fact and/or law. Most legal 
systems allow for some degree of exoneration if the offender was unaware of certain elements of 
an offence as far as they relate to simple facts. The classic textbook case is the error in persona 
vel obiecto, exemplified by the hunter who shoots at a bush in which he thinks a wild boar is 
hiding, while in fact it is a poacher. Other cases include the belief in the consent of the victim in 
sexual offences.  These examples have in common that they relate to empirical facts: Consent is 
or is not given, the target is or is not a person etc. This category of mistake will not normally be 
problematic in the hate-speech cases: D knows what he says. It is the legal characterisation of the 
content of what is said which raises issues. Again, doctrinally they can arise as part of the actus 
reus or as a general defence: Whether a chattel is someone else’s property is a question of law, 
but part of the actus reus of theft. D must thus in principle know the legal situation and this 
requires him to make a judgment of law. Similarly, whether under a tripartite system as the 
German model D is aware of the ambit of the criterion of permissible force in self-defence as a 
general defence outside the Tatbestand is a question of law. The exact classification is more or 
less irrelevant because most if not all legal systems tend to treat errors of law as not providing a 
defence, and judgments of law required of the offender in the context or normative elements do 
not have to reach the level of accuracy and expertise which a fully qualified legal practitioner 
might bring to bear, but the insight of the offender in laymen’s terms will usually be sufficient; 
this will apply mutatis mutandis if the question of law is part of the general offence description, 
as in theft above
72
. Otherwise, only lawyers could commit offences. Whether D has this 
layman’s insight will depend on the evidence in each individual case, if the issue becomes 
controversial at all, for similar reasons as above with foresight. In sum, once we have jumped the 
general policy hurdle of the legal exceptions of factual causation, the mens rea in the indivdual 
case does not present any fundamental systemic problems. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This preliminary study was intended to show that in cases of serious hate-speech or 
inflammatory speech in general, the question of liability is not restricted to mere specific speech 
offences. The particular context of the well-known scenarios surrounding anti-Islamic 
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inflammatory speech and the predictable violent reactions of a small but nonetheless sizeable 
group of indisputably misguided people should give us pause to think about a legal re-
characterisation of the act of publicising egregious hate-speech in terms of homicide (or assault) 
offences. While the actual detailed doctrinal construction of that liability – which was not the 
aim of this paper – may vary from country to country, certain underlying criteria seem trans-
systemically applicable. One is causation, the other that of the permissible risk. They both merge 
in the transformation of a moral question into two distinct legal categories: Is it, on the one hand, 
required to exempt an offender from the reach of factual causation for moral reasons, and on the 
other, where does the gatekeeper function of the freedom of speech protection end? We have 
answered the first question in the negative and left the second – by necessity – open to the 
regulation of each individual country.  
 
It may be wishful thinking to hope that there will be a unified common stance at any time in the 
future, and even the mere thought of that may cause concerns about the rise of authoritarian 
thought and  the abolition of free speech with wide sections of the readership. This paper does 
not advocate anything of the sort. Indeed, in the final analysis, freedom of speech must in a 
secular society always prevail over any attempts to declare a certain topic or the interests of a 
certain sector of society as exempt from hard-hitting criticism: Thought-crime is still a more 
sinister aspect than hate-crime. However, in the current popular political discussion many would 
seem to arrive at that moral singularity too quickly and without proper foundation. Hence, the 
invocations of free speech by media and other protagonists who engage in exercises of pushing 
the envelope with regard to freedom of expression have an occasional hollow ring to them, 
especially if there is a mixture with commercial interests. The simple truth is: The fact that you 
are allowed under law to say something does not mean that you should always say it, if it hurts 
someone else. That is a question of common civility. Especially if the harm arising from your 
speech moves from  mere offence to physical injury or even death. This, of course, applies even 
more if you are not allowed to say it in the first place, only in this instance it does not seem 
outlandish to hold the speaker liable not only for the insult but also for the injury.  
